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NO. 17 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
A New Arctic Strategy for the EU 
Maritime Security and Geopolitical Signalling 
Michael Paul 
The European Union is an Arctic actor with a long record of engagement. Climate 
change and safeguarding the Arctic, sustainable development and international co-
operation are the priority areas guiding its Arctic policy and its numerous projects 
in the region. Although the Union lacks formal observer status in the Arctic Council, 
member states Finland, Sweden and the Kingdom of Denmark are members of the 
body, along with Iceland and Norway, which are members of the European Economic 
Area and participate in the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation. 
Whereas the environmental and sustainability elements spelled out in the Com-
mission’s communication of 2016 remain highly relevant, the region’s growing geo-
political significance makes the lack of a security policy component an increasingly 
pressing concern. This should therefore be addressed in the EU’s new Arctic policy, 
which is currently being finalised after the public consultation ended in November 
2020. Maritime security offers a tested and appropriate field for expanding EU 
engagement. 
 
The dramatic impacts of climate change 
create huge challenges across the Arctic, 
which states seek to address in their respec-
tive Arctic strategies. As the Commission 
communication of April 2016 notes, it is 
“more important than ever to ensure that 
the Arctic remains a zone of peace, pros-
perity and constructive international 
cooperation”. The document does not, 
however, say how this is to be achieved 
in practice. 
Over the past three years numerous 
states – and in one case multiple minis-
tries and several branches of the armed 
forces – have published new Arctic 
strategy documents. In 2019 France, the 
United States (Navy, Coast Guard and Penta-
gon), Germany and Canada issued new or 
updated strategies. The US Air Force, Russia, 
Sweden, Norway and Poland followed suit 
in 2020. In January 2021 the US Navy and 
US Marine Corps published a joint strategy 
document, closely followed by another from 
the US Department of Homeland Security. 
India has placed a draft Arctic Strategy on 
the internet for discussion; Denmark, Fin-
land and Switzerland are expected to follow 
in the course of 2021. The European Com-
mission plans to publish its own new Arctic 
Policy in the autumn. 
The number of new strategy papers is 
striking enough in itself. Those published 
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to date also embody a significant shift in 
content, with all except India’s placing 
greater emphasis on security risks or men-
tioning the topic for the first time. One 
reason for this is Russian military activities, 
which may be understandable from the 
Kremlin’s perspective but have unsettled 
other Arctic states and created a security 
dilemma. The extent to which the Sino-
Russian cooperation will also develop a 
military aspect in the Arctic is another un-
certainty. When Russia assumes the chair 
of the Arctic Council at the May 2021 
ministerial meeting in Reykjavik it will 
also have to address the resulting conflict 
potential. 
Arctic Security Policy Challenges 
All the Arctic states want the circumpolar 
region to be a space of peace, stability, 
cooperation and low tension. The risk of 
escalating conflict remains small but does 
exist. Many of Russia’s military activities 
and ambitious arms projects can be attri-
buted to its self-understanding as a great 
power, its safeguarding of economic inter-
ests and its desire to be treated as an equal 
by the United States and its NATO allies. 
The Arctic and the North Atlantic area are 
an important part of Moscow’s overall 
strategy and the Kremlin is not unaware 
of the growing conflict potential. 
Aggressive rhetoric and activities not-
withstanding, Russia’s strategic objectives 
in the region are fundamentally defensive 
and stem from a persistent sense of vulner-
ability. But Moscow has neglected to foster 
understanding for its Arctic policy through 
transparency and confidence-building. 
Instead it is perceived as an aggressive mili-
tary power riding roughshod over the secu-
rity interests of other countries. Its Arctic 
neighbours respond by expanding their 
military capacities and preparing for poten-
tial conflict. In that respect the situation 
has changed fundamentally over the past 
decade: the Arctic has lost its exceptional 
character as a zone of peace and coopera-
tion. 
Ten years ago, Sweden’s strategy for the 
Arctic still rested on an assessment that 
the “current security policy challenges in 
the Arctic” were “not of a military nature”. 
“In bilateral and multilateral contexts”, it 
concluded, “an approach based on a broad 
concept of security” should be emphasised 
and “the use of civil instruments is prefer-
able to military means”. Alongside the ne-
cessity for peace and security, the new strat-
egy paper of November 2020 underlines the 
“new military dynamic in the Arctic region”. 
Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines of 
August 2019 dedicate an entire chapter to 
the security dimension and call for “more 
intensive involvement in the security policy 
implications of the Arctic on the part of the 
EU and NATO”. French Defence Minister 
Florence Parly noted in 2019 that heightened 
competition between states in the region 
was a major new challenge that could one 
day lead to confrontation. In her foreword 
to the French strategy document Parly 
quotes Michel Rocard, former French prime 
minister and French Ambassador for Inter-
national Negotiations on Arctic and Ant-
arctic: “It’s a second Middle East!” These 
statements underline the extent to which 
geopolitical change and insecurity charac-
terise the current situation. 
The EU’s new Arctic Strategy will there-
fore need to address security. For Brussels 
this means a balancing act between Arctic 
and non-Arctic states, EU and NATO states, 
geopolitics and geoeconomics, high expec-
tations and inadequate capabilities. The 
upshot is a multitude of conflicting goals. 
The EU’s Place in the Arctic 
At the beginning of the five-year cycle, Euro-
pean Commission President Ursula von der 
Leyen pledged to lead a “geopolitical Com-
mission”. “Europe must learn the language 
of power”, she declared in a keynote speech 
on 8 November 2019 in Berlin. That also 
meant “building our own muscles [in areas] 
where we’ve long been relying on others – 
for example in security policies.” But Brus-
sels is in no position (nor is it willing) to 
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balance a weakening America, an ambi-
tious China and an aggressive Russia. That 
would overstretch the Union and require 
more – especially military – power re-
sources than is currently politically realis-
tic or realisable. As Michael Mann, the 
EU’s Arctic envoy since April 2020, put it: 
“We are not hard security providers, and 
we don’t have anything approaching a 
European army, so, for us, the idea of secu-
rity includes things like health issues, en-
vironmental issues and search-and-rescue.” 
In light of the geopolitical shifts, no new 
Arctic Strategy can afford to ignore the 
security challenges and the necessary con-
clusions – as the Swedish case demon-
strates. So what contribution can the EU 
make, assuming it wishes to stay the multi-
lateral course of cooperation without ignor-
ing the risks? 
Maritime security is a field where the 
EU’s recognised abilities match a well-
known need in the region. The measures 
laid out in the European Union Maritime 
Security Strategy (EUMSS) serve capacity-
building and resilience against external 
interference, and contribute to enhancing 
maritime, aviation and satellite awareness. 
Here the Arctic suffers significant deficits, 
while the EU has a wealth of practical 
experience to contribute: The growth in 
Arctic shipping is associated with risks that 
need to be addressed, from marine invasive 
species as an environmental problem to the 
prospect of foreign fishing fleets presenting 
challenges for the coast guard. As already 
laid out in the EU’s strategy of 2016, mari-
time security needs to be improved. 
For example better maritime domain 
awareness (as a decisive component of 
EUMSS) is needed to secure shipping routes. 
Currently communication coverage is 
patchy or entirely absent, making it diffi-
cult or impossible to deploy and coordinate 
search and rescue (SAR) teams when ships 
and their crews are in distress. Any vessel in 
trouble in the Arctic is in acute danger. As 
navigation increases the annual figure for 
incidents in the Arctic has increased from 
28 (2007) to 71 (2017), mostly attributable 
to mechanical failure. The dearth of SAR per-
sonnel and resources means that managing 
risk is the best that can be done. 
Maritime security demands a combina-
tion of soft and hard security resources. 
The EU member states already possess these 
in the Arctic – from shared norms to the 
means for satellite surveillance, coastal pro-
tection and naval operations. Here, how-
ever, the old problem of EU-NATO relations 
pops up: the potential for cooperation on 
maritime security is only sketchily defined, 
still less agreed and coordinated. One posi-
tive exception is the Baltic Maritime Com-
ponent Command in Rostock, which will 
serve both NATO and the EU (though pri-
marily the former), focussing on operations 
in the Baltic and NATO’s northern flank. 
A Viable Strategy towards Russia 
If the new EU Arctic Strategy is to give 
realistic guidance for the future it must 
address Russia both as a problem and a 
challenge (with and without China). Euro-
pean and Russian interests coincide in 
certain policy areas – even if prioritisa-
tions may diverge and the situation over 
eastern Ukraine and Crimea will dictate 
caution over any – even selective – en-
gagement. But using the Arctic as an arena 
for renewing relations, might have positive 
spill-over effects on other areas of dispute. 
Russia will be interested in projects and 
scientific exchange as long as they are 
politically unproblematic (like Arctic scien-
tific research and environmental projects). 
Its own agenda, however, foregrounds 
national security. When Russia assumes the 
chair of Arctic Council in May 2021, energy 
and military security will therefore be its 
priorities, while climate change matters 
tend to be secondary. But Russia is natu-
rally also interested in enhancing SAR capa-
bilities in the circumpolar Arctic and open 
to cross-border cooperation on environmen-
tal issues. 
The European Union’s broad spectrum 
of regional competencies, expert knowledge 
and existing initiatives can serve as a frame-
work for putative joint projects. Its broader 
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decisions and activities also directly impact 
the region’s economic development. The 
EU is not least an important market for the 
Arctic energy and fisheries sectors. 
Concretely, maritime security and safety 
offers a tried and tested field for coopera-
tion, with projects like ARCSAR (Arctic and 
North Atlantic Security and Emergency Pre-
paredness Network) supplying suitable 
examples. New projects could tackle Arctic 
infrastructure expansion. Given the grave 
infrastructure deficits, EU support would 
benefit international shipping, and Euro-
pean climate and environmental standards 
could be useful for both sustainable devel-
opment and safeguarding the environment. 
A viable strategy will need to take this into 
account not only for regions adjoining the 
Russian Arctic and relations with Russia, 
but also for Greenland, whose Project In-
dependence could give rise to new mari-
time vulnerabilities in terms of securing 
shipping routes and associated infrastruc-
ture. 
Russia, for its part, will have to work 
during its upcoming Arctic Council chair-
manship to reduce the growing conflict 
potential noted in its own Arctic Strategy. 
Continuing collaboration in the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) and enhancing 
regional security dialogue are also in the 
interest of the new U.S. administration. An 
expert dialogue on Arctic military security 
could be initiated as a substitute for the 
Chiefs of Defence meetings that were sus-
pended in 2014 – or as prelude to reacti-
vating them. That could involve taking up 
the Recommendations of the NATO-Russia 
expert dialogue before potentially moving 
on to agree military rules of conduct for the 
Arctic, which could also include maritime 
security measures (like an Arctic Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea framework). 
Then Finnish Prime Minister Antti Rinne 
said in October 2019 that “there should 
be more EU in the Arctic and more Arctic 
in the EU”, as the EU had a lot to offer the 
region. Brussels can contribute to maritime 
security and should also pursue an Arctic-
specific connectivity policy (digitalisation, 
navigation, logistics, transport). But the EU 
will not become an Arctic security actor in 
the foreseeable future, because it lacks the 
required military capabilities. In that light, 
the new EU-Arctic Strategy should include 
more maritime security and the European 
Global Strategy more Arctic – signalling a 
concrete expansion of its geopolitical scope. 
Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division at SWP. 
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